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Interestingly, his net salary of 10M€ per year 2 does not merit his inclusion in the Top 8 highest earning soccer players in the world 3 . The reported transfer prices and salaries in soccer demonstrate that players are the key component for a professional soccer club and justify that their prospective services must be recognised as an accounting asset (Morrow, 1996) . These observations seem obvious and can be applied to any other sport. However, player value has never been incorporated among determinants of professional sports firm value in any previous studies. Yet, players are an asset of each club and those acquired on the 
Determinants of professional sports firm values in Europe
As for player values, no prior studies tested for a significantly positive impact of profit. A hypothesis can be proposed to explain the fact that profit has never been included among the determinants of professional sports firm values: the current profit of a firm is not significant in explaining a firm's value. This suggests that revenues may be a better basis upon which to calculate value than profit because revenues are a good indication of a club's capacity to generate cash, whereas profit depends on financial management, any change in which can influence a firm's capacity to generate profit. Nevertheless, revenues should not be incorporated among the determinants of Forbes values since these values are calculated as a "multiple of revenues" (Fort, 2006; Geckil, Mahon & Anderson, 2007; Vine, 2004) . Besides, an effective financial management team could itself be a determinant of club values. In this article, we propose to test the impact of operating income on value; this being used as a proxy for profit which is not always available.
Until 2004 no publicly valuation of European soccer teams was available. During that year,
Forbes proposed for the first time a list of the 20 most valuable European soccer teams.
Forbes interest in European soccer teams could be the consequence of increasing revenues in
European soccer since the 1980s (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) . The fact that the valuation of European teams is so recent and incorporates only the 20 or 25 most valuable soccer teams doubtless explains why there had been no study of the determinants of European team values until as late as 2011 (Helleu, Scelles & Durand, 2011; Scelles, Helleu & Durand, 2012 We will not focus on these differing objectives or on local community reaction to this influx of foreign capital (Bi, 2013) First, we present its theoretical basis, before going on to specify our empirical model and describe our data. In the third section we present our results. The results are discussed in the fourth section along with their implications and future research directions, with the final section of the paper setting out our conclusions.
Theoretical basis
Contributions about firm values are numerous in the managerial literature. By contrast, to our knowledge, there are only seven published papers that deal with determinants of professional sports firm values. These can be separated into two groups: those concerning real transaction prices (Humphreys & Lee, 2010; Humphreys & Mondello, 2008) , in which the oldest data dates back to the 1960s and leagues are not distinguished (except via dummies); and those concerning values determined other than by transaction through Financial World and Forbes (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Büschemann & Deutscher, 2011; Miller, 2007 Miller, , 2009 Scelles Helleu, Durand & Bonnal, 2013a) , for which data continue or begin in the 1990s or even the 2000s, and each league is analyzed separately.
What are Forbes' values?
Prior to the literature review, it is important to clarify the nature of the team values provided by Forbes. Unfortunately, Forbes is somewhat vague about this: "Current values are Forbes estimates based on past transactions, enterprise values (market value plus debt) of publicly traded teams and current stadium deal (unless a new stadium is pending)." (Forbes, 2007) . As noted in the Introduction section, Forbes values are calculated as a "multiple of revenues" (Fort, 2006; Geckil et al., 2007; Vine, 2004) . Fort (2006, p. 12) writes that Michael Ozanian, one of the authors of the Forbes team valuation reports, revealed that those reports are a "multiple of revenues" estimate, adjusted for specific stadium/arena lease factors estimated by those authors. Vine (2004, p. 9) indicates that Forbes prefers the use of revenue rather than operating income because it is more representative of long term values. This is consistent with the hypothesis suggested in the Introduction to explain why operating income has never been incorporated among the determinants of professional team values in previous research. Geckil et al. (2007) also stress the "income approach". They note that Forbes has no specific methodology and the author's judgment is a significant part of the valuation method but they consider that this is an unavoidable part of estimating the value of any company. For this reason, they conclude that "the Forbes estimates should be accorded some respect as a consistently presented effort to systematically estimate values, with at least a selection of supporting data and commentary." (Geckil et al., 2007, p. 2) . 
Literature review about the determinants of professional sports firm values

Empirical model and data description
Empirical model
The empirical model that we examine takes the form of:
F ti is the logarithm of the franchise value of team i in year t, X ti is a matrix of independent variables that affect the team's value, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ε ti is a vector of random error terms. We chose the logarithm of the franchise values because these ones are not equally distributed (Büschemann & Deutscher, 2011) .
The X ti matrix includes variables used in previous studies (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Miller, 2007 Miller, , 2009 Humphreys and Mondello, 2008; Humphreys and Lee, 2010; Büschemann and Deutscher, 2011; Scelles et al., 2013a) : In the Champions League, sports performance in t and t-1 corresponds to a measure with a predetermined code:
-6 for a champion title;
-5 for final;
-4 for semi-final;
-3 for quarter-final;
-1 for elimination during the group stages;
-0 for no participation.
Lastly, we add operating income provided by Forbes, player values provided by transfermarkt and a dummy for new foreign ownership (1 if new, 0 if not).
Data description
The sample consists of a pooled, cross-sectional, time-series panel of team-specific data for Team values and local competition data were generated by Forbes. Regional per capita income data were obtained from Eurostat. FUA population data was available on population data. Facility age, ownership and sports performance data were available on Wikipedia.
Annual global attendance data were obtained from European football statistics. Player values were found on transfermarkt. We integrate dummies for championships with England the reference and for years with 2013 the reference. Table 2 can take into account this potential endogeneity by finding an instrument variable which has a significant effect on attendance (or its logarithm) and no significant effect on club value (or its logarithm). Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain this instrument. Consequently, we assume that attendance is exogenous. Significance and values for the estimated parameters are not sensitive to the presence of attendance. Table 4 presents the results obtained by generalized linear squares regressions with time fixed effects. We comment on these results, comparing them with those obtained previously by Scelles et al. (2013a) . The differences between this data and their data for European soccer are: the period (2005-2013 instead of 2004-2011) ; the incorporation of national sports performance, operating income and player value; and the consideration of the country effect.
A R² of 0.698 was obtained in Scelles et al. (2013a) , compared to 0.915 in this study.
Income has a significant positive impact at the 1% level. This finding coincided with that of Scelles et al. (2013a) who find no significant impact for three of the four American major leagues and even a significantly negative impact in the NBA. Their interpretation is that for European clubs it is better to be in an economically prosperous area because of limited revenue sharing that exists between teams within a country and also between countries (Andreff, 2007; Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Szymanski, 2003) . Indeed, there are large differences in the value national television rights deals between countries, while within each domestic league the distribution of rights results in marked differences in the sums earned by individual clubs. More generally, an economically prosperous area offers better opportunities in terms of sponsoring and merchandising and allows a club to set high prices for tickets to attend a match.
Population has a significant negative impact at the 5% level (a result also reported by Scelles et al., 2013a) whereas the impact of local competition is significantly positive at the 10% level (significant at the 1% level in Scelles et al., 2013a) . A contrary result could have been expected, i.e. positive impact of population and negative impact of local competition given that a club must share local economic resources with one or several other club. One limitation of this study is the fact that not all local rival clubs are incorporated, only those ranked in the Forbes lists.
Facility age has the expected significant negative impact at the 1% level (consistent with Scelles et al., 2013a) . It supports new facility projects for owners even if it does not solve the question of financing between public and private funds. Private ownership has the expected significant positive impact at the 1% level (compared to the 5% level in Scelles et al., 2013a) .
As Scelles et al. (2013a) note, this is consistent with the interpretation of Miller (2007, p. 449) for whom : "A team playing in a stadium that it owns will be able to capitalize the value of the stadium in the team's franchise value and will thus have a higher franchise value."
New foreign ownership has a significant positive impact at the 1% level. Irrespective of the owners' objective (profit or utility maximisation), new foreign owners have had a positive effect on the values of English clubs as estimated by Forbes.
Attendance has the expected significant positive impact at the 1% level whereas it had no significant impact in Scelles et al. (2013a) . Consequently, our result contradicts the interpretation that they formulated. Indeed, Scelles et al. (2013a) put in perspective their result for attendance (no significant impact) with the significantly positive impact of income.
From their point of view, for generating revenue and thus optimizing value, a club needs to be in an economically prosperous area within which people are able to spend a lot of money, rather than having a stadium full of people but eventually without maximizing gate receipts.
According to our result, the two dimensions are necessary.
National sports performances in t and t-1 have no significant impact whereas that in the historical period has the expected significant positive impact at the 1% level. Continental sports performance in t has no significant impact whereas it has a significant positive impact at the 1% level in Scelles et al. (2013a) . Continental sports performance in t-1 and historical continental sports performance have the expected significant positive impact at the 5% level (compared with the 1% level in Scelles et al., 2013a) . These results indicate that past sports performances (last year and historical ones) are more important than sports performances in t in explaining club value in t even if sports performances in t become past ones in t+1.
Historical sports performances thus seem good measures to capture the historical potential of a club, an unsurprising factor to explain team value.
Operating income and player value have a significant positive impact at the 1% level. While these results were expected, it is of note that these variables had never been incorporated among potential determinants of professional sports firm values in previous studies. We consider the implications of these important results in the next section of the paper.
The English Premier League is the European league which generates the largest revenues (Deloitte, 2013) , hence why it was selected as the reference. Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Scotland and Spain have the expected significant negative impact at the 1% level (5% level for Netherlands). However, France has no significant impact and Italy has a significantly positive impact at the 5% level. Yet, Italy and France had been decreasingly competitive over (Andreff, 2007; Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Noll, 2003; Szymanski, 2003) . Several clubs ranked by Forbes were relegated during the period studied:
Leeds United, Newcastle United, West Ham United and Juventus FC, the most prestigious and valuable of these clubs. According to Scelles et al. (2013a) , it could explain that most of time dummies are not significantly negative in comparison with the last year. Nevertheless, our results indicate that this is the case except for the last year but one.
Discussion, implications and future directions
Discussion
Results for population and local competition
We have already discussed our results individually other than for operating income and player value for which implications are developed below. Nevertheless, it seems important to emphasise the surprising results for population and local competition. The fact that only the most valuable European soccer clubs are taken into account in our study has been mentioned as a limitation. We tested our model with local competition, taken as the number of other teams playing in the first soccer division during the season under consideration and located in the same functional urban area (Mean = 2.5784; SD = 2.2533; Minimum = 0; Maximum = 7). Table 5 provides our new results. The impacts of population and competition become significant only at the 10% level instead of 5% level but they are still respectively negative and positive. We also tested our model with the log of the population divided by the number of rival teams instead of the two variables separately, both with only rival teams as listed by
Forbes and then with all those rivals playing in the first division (Appendices 2 and 3). The impact of the new variable is significantly negative at the 1% level in the first model and at the 10% in the second model.
To understand the negative impact of population, the work of Kuper and Szymanski (2012) The growing importance of commercialisation since the 1980s could have led to European capitals becoming the most performing cities (Helleu, 2007) . Now, if the small provincial towns are not able to perform on a long or even medium term basis anymore, Kuper and Szymanski (2012) note that the biggest provincial clubs (Manchester United, Liverpool, Bayern, Barcelona, the two Milan clubs) have built up strong brands and are sufficiently populated to remain at the top of European soccer. These clubs are not really in the biggest provincial cities but they are in the biggest countries in Europe and have the largest television deals. These elements are consistent with the negative impact of population on value for the clubs in our sample that partially correspond to those described above: London (big capital) versus provincial clubs in the biggest countries. The absence of local competitors is globally associated with clubs in small provincial towns that are not able to perform consistently over the medium term (Newcastle, Olympique Lyonnais, Olympique de Marseille, Stuttgart, Werder Bremen, Porto, Valencia). As such, it could explain the positive impact of competition on club value. Another explanation is that rivalry in itself can trigger people's interest for soccer and hence for their local teams. It is well documented that local derbies attract more spectators, other things being equal (Baimbridge, Cameron & Dawson, 1996; Buraimo & Simmons, 2008; Cairns, 1987; Hart, Hutton & Sharot, 1975; Peel & Thomas, 1992; Scelles, Durand, Bonnal, Goyeau & Andreff, 2013) .
Impact of new ownership on club value
Our 
Implications
Operating income
The first part of the principal objective in this study was to observe if operating income is a significant determinant of European professional soccer club value. The results show that it is indeed the case. However, some models estimate value from discounted cash flows (Markham, 2013) . Operating income can be seen as a proxy for cash flows. Consequently, operating income could be a proxy for value and so should not be integrated among its determinants. Nevertheless, discounted cash flows models are based on the expected future profits. Now, operating income in n-1 (since Forbes bases its evaluations for n on the financial data in n-1) is not an expected future profit. It can be considered as an indicator for managerial and financial expertise which seems a relevant determinant of the value.
Besides, the hierarchy between clubs for operating income is not coincident with the hierarchy for value. For example, in 2005, AC Milan, the third most valuable club, and Chelsea, the eighth most valuable club, were the only clubs in the first sixteen which reported a negative operating income. More generally, the correlation coefficient between value and operating income is 0.61, a good but not very strong one, especially in comparison with the correlation coefficient between value and revenue (0.84). The fact that the correlation between these two indicators is strong is logical since revenue multiples play a large part in Forbes' clubs valuation (Markham, 2013) .
With regard to these elements, a previous operating income can be considered as a determinant and not the "essence" of value. In other words, the capacity to control costs and generate operating income is a determinant of value, but not a necessary condition. A club can counterbalance a negative operating income thanks to other determinants. These observations may be surprising. In any case, it is preferable to maximize operating income: it supposes a financial or managerial expertise beyond commercial and sporting ones (Durand, Ravenel & Helleu, 2005) . A club must be attentive not only to the importance of good (and thus well paid) employees on the field of play, but also off the field of play.
Player value
The second part of our principal objective in this study was to observe if player value is a significant determinant of European professional soccer club value. The results show it is the case. Consequently, a strategy based on cost minimization to optimize profit and value is not a good one since it limits the possibility to have players with high value. Players are part of a club's assets, which in turn legitimises their impact on value especially as they contribute to the generation of additional income: i.e. improved sports performances and notoriety will attract more spectators in the stadiums, increased merchandising, more sponsors and allow the club to earn more money from TV rights (partially linked to sports performances and notoriety).
Our result for player value can be used to deal with the "old" debate about the objective of clubs' owners: are they profit or utility maximizers (Rottenberg, 1956; Sloane, 1971) 
Global results
Operating income and player value optimizations are just two parts of the more global club value optimization. Our results show that other determinants are significant (we leave aside population and local competition for reasons provided previously): inhabitants' income, facility age, private ownership, attendance, continental sports performance during the last year, historical sports performance both in national and continental competitions and the national league in which the club is involved. Whether they are tangible (players, stadium) or intangible (club prestige, national league and its TV rights, fanbase and customer catchment area -some elements we can consider as related to club brand), all these determinants are part of team assets and owners and managers must be attentive to every asset's contribution to the value of a club. Nevertheless, they do not monitor all of them: inhabitants' income does not depend on the club strategy; a new facility can depend on a public decision; attendance can be limited by local potential; historical sports performance cannot be changed in the short or medium term; the club is under the influence of the national league prestige and strategy.
Owners and managers must optimize every determinant under the constraints of the local context, the club history and the league in which it operates.
An interesting question is how a club should prioritize its investment? Allouche and Soulez (2005, p. 8) note that "the hypothesis is often moved forward that Manchester United had taken advantage of its stock exchange introduction for having used, in priority, funds raised by the introduction to finance structural investments (stadiums, facilities). On the contrary, the symmetric hypothesis is formulated about clubs that had not taken advantage of their introduction, which wants that raised funds had been used, in priority, to finance risky transfers." This second hypothesis can be illustrated by the examples of Newcastle, Leeds
United and Borussia Dortmund which invested in players instead of stadium. However, according to our results, investment in players is important. When Newcastle invested in Les Ferdinand, David Ginola and Alan Shearer in the middle of the 1990s, it reinforced the club value and led it in the top of the English Premier League. Thereafter the club did not sustain the same level of sports performance. Perhaps more balanced investments between players and structural assets would have been better. Rather than prioritizing one determinant, owners and managers must be attentive to all the significant determinants and be aware that both profit and utility maximizations are compatible and even necessary to value maximization.
Future owners and managers can take into account all the significant determinants before deciding to choose a club.
Future directions
In our results, we suggest the necessity to extend the number of teams evaluated so as to observe if the impacts of population and local competition remain respectively negative and positive. Indeed, Forbes is based on only 20 -25 clubs, whereas there are 114 teams in the first divisions alone of the six major European leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain). We can anticipate that the sign of the impact for population will change with a larger number of teams. (Desbordes, 2007) . The best soccer clubs have fans everywhere and are powerful global brands (Couveleare & Richelieu, 2005) . They have sponsorship deals with international firms: for example, Dubai's Emirates Airline (Real Madrid), Chevrolet (Manchester United) and Qatar Foundation (FC Barcelona). How can we measure the international dimension of such firms? One option may be to incorporate social media in value models (Scelles et al., 2013a) . Their hypothesis is that the number of fans on Facebook or the number of followers on Twitter can be a measure of an international dimension. Scelles, Helleu, Durand and Bonnal (2013b) 
The result is significant at the 5% level if the sign is not in brackets; the result is not significant at the 5% level if the sign is in brackets.
1 Scelles et al. (2013a) include sports performance in the UEFA Champions League for European soccer. Player values are those in t. Other data for Chelsea and Manchester City are based on Forbes (revenues and operating income in t-1), not for Paris and Monaco (revenues and operating income in t at the beginning of new foreign ownership but in t-1 for data in 2013 because those in t were not available when the article was submitted). These data for Malaga and Anzhi Makhachkala are not available. Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
